Courts Martial

Citation: R. v. Master Seaman R.E. Leblanc, 2007 CM 2001

Docket: 200657

STANDING COURT MARTIAL

CANADA

NOVA SCOTIA

HALIFAX

Date: 12 January 2007

PRESIDING: COMMANDER P.J. LAMONT, M.J.

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

v.

MASTER SEAMAN R.E. LEBLANC

(Offender)

SENTENCE

(Rendered orally)

[1]                    Master Seaman Leblanc, having accepted and recorded your pleas of guilty to the related, less serious offence of common assault on charge No. 1, and a charge of fighting with a person subject to the Code of Service Discipline in charge No. 3, this court now finds you guilty of those offences and directs a stay of proceedings with respect to charge No. 2.

[2]                    It now falls to me to determine and to pass a sentence upon you.  In so doing, I have considered the principles of sentencing that apply in the ordinary courts of criminal jurisdiction in Canada and at courts martial.  I have as well considered the facts of the case as described in the Statement of Circumstances, Exhibit 6; the evidence heard in the course of the mitigation proceedings; and the submissions of counsel, both for the prosecution and for the defence.

[3]                    The principles of sentencing guide the court in the exercise of its discretion in determining a fit and proper sentence in an individual case.  The sentence should be broadly commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the blameworthiness or degree of responsibility and character of the offender.  The court is guided by the sentences imposed by other courts in previous similar cases, not out of a slavish adherence to precedent, but because it appeals to our common sense of justice that like cases should be treated in similar ways.  Nevertheless, in imposing sentence the court takes account of the many factors that distinguish the particular case it is dealing with, both the aggravating circumstances that may call for a more severe punishment, and the mitigating circumstances that may reduce a sentence.

[4]                    The goals and objectives of sentencing have been expressed in different ways in many previous cases.  Generally, they relate to the protection of society, which includes, of course, the Canadian Forces, by fostering and maintaining a just, a peaceful, a safe, and a law-abiding community.  Importantly, in the context of the Canadian Forces, these objectives include the maintenance of discipline, that habit of obedience which is so necessary to the effectiveness of an armed force.  The goals and objectives also include deterrence of the individual so that the conduct of the offender is not repeated, and  general deterrence so that others will not be led to follow the example of the offender.  Other goals include the rehabilitation of the offender, the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender, and the denunciation of unlawful behaviour. 

[5]                    One or more of these goals and objectives will inevitably predominate in arriving at a fit and just sentence in an individual case, yet it should not be lost sight of that each of these goals calls for the attention of the sentencing court.  And a fit and just sentence should be a wise blending of these goals, tailored to the particular circumstances of the case.

[6]                    As I told you when you tendered your pleas of guilty, section 139 of the National Defence Act prescribes the possible punishments that may be imposed at courts martial.  Those possible punishments are limited by the provision of the law which creates the offence and provides for a maximum punishment, and are further limited to the jurisdiction that may be exercised by this court.  Only one sentence is imposed upon an offender, whether the offender is found guilty of one or more different offences.  But the sentence may consist of more than one punishment.  It is an important principle that the court should impose the least severe punishment that will maintain discipline.  In arriving at the sentence in this case, I have considered the direct and indirect consequences for the offender of the findings of guilt and the sentence I am about to impose.

[7]                    The facts of the offences are described in Exhibit 6.  In brief, in the early morning hours of 20 November 2004, the offender was involved in an altercation with a cook, Master Seaman Martin, in the Junior Ranks Mess aboard HMCS HALIFAX alongside Norfolk, Virginia, U.S.A.  The matter began as a verbal dispute, but apparently escalated until the offender picked up a full can of beer and threw it in the direction of Master Seaman Martin.  The can hit another member of the mess, Leading Seaman Lindhorst, in the eye, causing serious damage.  Then the offender and Master Seaman Martin began fighting with each other until they were separated by other members who were present in the mess.

[8]                    I accept the evidence of the offender that he did not intend to injure Leading Seaman Lindhorst, and I also accept the submission of counsel on behalf of the offender that the offender did not intend to strike either Master Seaman Martin or Leading Seaman Lindhorst when he threw the beer can.  There is no evidence that the fight caused any particular harm to Master Seaman Martin.  Counsel before me jointly submit that a fit sentence in this case is a period of 14 days' detention, to be suspended.  In addition, the prosecution submits that a fine of $2,000 should also be imposed. 

[9]                    The sentence to be pronounced is, of course, a matter for the court, but where, as in this case, both parties agree on a recommended disposition, that recommendation carries substantial weight with the court.  The courts of appeal across Canada, including the Court Marital Appeal Court, have held that the joint submission of counsel as to sentence should be accepted by the court unless the recommended sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the public interest. 

[10]                  The present case is one of those cases where the consequences of a crime are out of all proportion to the moral blameworthiness of the offender.  I accept, on the basis of the evidence I have heard, that the offender's assaultive behaviour was entirely out of character.  It was but a moment of lack of self-discipline and judgement on his part that has had extremely serious consequences for Leading Seaman Lindhorst's health and, perhaps, his career in the Navy.  I accept that the offender is genuinely sorry for his actions, but no amount of remorse can restore Leading Seaman Lindhorst's health or his career prospects in the Navy.

[11]                  The prosecution emphasizes these consequences in support of their position as to sentence and relies upon several previous decisions at courts martial involving different types of harm occasioned by assaultive behaviour.  I confess to some difficulty with this position.  In my view, it is inconsistent to accept a plea of guilty to the less serious offence of common assault, but rely upon the degree of bodily harm caused by the assault as a feature aggravating the sentence the court should impose.  I remind myself that this offender has pleaded guilty only to common assault in respect of Leading Seaman Lindhorst and fighting in respect of Master Seaman Martin.

[12]                  I accept the joint submission of counsel that this case calls for a period of detention.  The self-discipline of all crew members aboard a warship is vital to the safety of all, and to the accomplishment of her missions.  As the facts of this case demonstrate, the failure to maintain one's self-discipline can have consequences for others that are far beyond anything intended by the individual concerned.  I have also considered the personal circumstances of the offender.  He is a mature man who is highly thought of by his superiors, with an unblemished record of service to this point.  He has performed his duties to a high level and likely has a fine naval career in his future.  The personal circumstances of the offender have persuaded me that the joint submission of counsel to suspend the sentence of detention would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, nor is it otherwise contrary to the public interest.  Accordingly, I accept the joint recommendation of counsel. 

[13]                  Taking account of all the circumstances, both of the offences and the offender, I am not persuaded that the sentence should include a monetary fine in addition to a period of detention. 

[14]                  The prosecution does not seek a weapons prohibition order under section 147.1 of the National Defence Act.  I have considered whether such an order should be made, and, in the absence of an application by the prosecution, I decline to make such an order.  Similarly, I have considered whether an order should be made that the offender supply suitable DNA samples under section 196.14 of the National Defence Act.  Again, in the absence of an application by the prosecution, I am not satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the administration of justice to make such an order.

[15]                  Stand up, Master Seaman Leblanc.  You are sentenced to detention for a period of 14 days.  Pursuant to section 215 of the National Defence Act, the carrying into effect of the punishment of detention is suspended. 

[16]                  The proceedings of this court martial in respect of Master Seaman Leblanc are hereby terminated.

                                                                                 COMMANDER P.J. LAMONT, M.J.

Counsel:

Major S.D. Richards, Regional Military Prosecutor Atlantic

Counsel for Her Majesty The Queen

Mr David Bright, Barrister, Boyne/Clarke, Barristers and Solicitors, 33 Alderney Drive, Suite 700, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia

Counsel for Master Seaman R.E. Leblanc