Courts Martial
Decision Information
Summary:
CMAC 494 - Appeal Dismissed
Date of commencement of the trial: 10 October 2006
Location: CFB Gagetown, F-1, Oromocto, NB.
Charges:
•Charge 1 (alternative to charge 2): S. 83 NDA, disobeyed a lawful command of a superior officer.
•Charge 2 (alternative to charge 1): S. 129 NDA, conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline.
Results:
•FINDING: Charge 1: Guilty. Charge 2: A stay of proceedings.
•SENTENCE: A reprimand and a fine in the amount of $500.
Decision Content
Page 1 of 12 Citation: R. v. Corporal J.J. Kennedy, 2006 CM 58 Docket: F200658 STANDING COURT MARTIAL CANADA NEW BRUNSWICK CANADIAN FORCES BASE GAGETOWN Date: 13 October 2006 PRESIDING:LIEUTENANT-COLONEL L.V. D'AUTEUIL, M.J. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN v. CORPORAL J.J. KENNEDY (Accused) FINDING (Rendered orally) INTRODUCTION [1] Corporal Kennedy is charged under section 83 of the National Defence Act, to wit, disobeyed a lawful command of a superior officer, and alternatively, he is charged under section 129 of the National Defence Act, to wit, conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline. [2] The facts on which the two counts are based relate to events that took place during the evening and the night of the 26 to the 27 June 2005 in Halifax during the Nova Scotia International Tattoo, and involving the 2 RCR Pipes and Drums platoon which the accused was part of at the time. THE EVIDENCE [3] The evidence before this court martial is composed essentially of the following facts: The testimonies heard in the order of their appearance before the court, the testimony of Warrant Officer Hughes, Corporal King, Corporal Bowmaster, Warrant Officer Fudge, Miss Watson, Corporal Arseneau,
Page 2 of 12 Corporal Richardson, Corporal Kennedy, the accused in this case, Corporal Hilson, Corporal Firth and Corporal Pierce; Exhibit 3, The National Defence Total Force Training Plan for the Driver Operator Light Support Vehicle Wheeled. This document was entered in evidence by consent; Exhibit 4, the Driving Information Test for the Operators of Mobile Support Equipment. This document was also entered in evidence by consent; Exhibit 5, the Rules and Regulations for Drivers of DND Vehicles. This document was also entered in evidence by consent; Exhibit 6, the Driver/Operator Proficiency Record of Corporal Kennedy. This document was also entered in evidence by consent; Exhibit 7, the course report of Corporal Kennedy concerning the Land Force Course Driver Wheeled he had. This document was also entered in evidence by consent; The judicial notice taken by the court of the facts and issues under Rule 15 of the Military Rules of Evidence. The facts [4] The facts involved in this case thus relate to a series of events that took place on the evening and the night of 26 to 27 June 2005 during the Nova Scotia International Tattoo in Halifax. The order [5] In June 2005, Corporal Kennedy was a member of the 2 RCR Pipes and Drums platoon. As usual, the platoon participated to the Nova Scotia International Tattoo, a show inspired by military tattoos given by military bands and display teams. It has taken place annually in Halifax for years, and the 2 RCR Pipes and Drums platoon has been traditionally part of it. In 2005, the Nova Scotia International Tattoo took place at the end of the month of June and the beginning of the month of July 2005. Then, the members of the 2 RCR Pipes and Drums were sent on temporary duty for two weeks, starting on 26 June 2005. [6] The platoon members travelled on the 26 June 2005 from Gagetown to
Page 3 of 12 Halifax. Corporal Kennedy was one of the drivers for the vehicle used that day. They arrived at the end of the afternoon that same day at Dalhousie University, location of their accommodations for this event. [7] The Drum Major, Sergeant Hughes, and the Pipe Major, Sergeant Heagle, took care of the administrative details for the check in and provided to each member of the platoon their room's key and meal sheet, and made sure that each member cleared in their room. Also, a meeting was called for 1800 hours in the TV room for a briefing to all the platoon members. [8] At that meeting, held by Sgt Hughes before all the platoon members, the latter provided timings for the evening and the next day, and the dress to be respected by the platoon members, gave the Tattoo ID, and he identified Corporal Kennedy as the duty driver. He told specifically to Corporal Kennedy before all other platoon members during that briefing that he shall not consume any alcohol, that he will have to do some runs between the accommodations and downtown Halifax, and that he must remain available for any other tasks that could involve the use of the vehicle. [9] Corporal Kennedy acknowledged the order and the task, even though he was not very happy with it considering that he would not be free for the night as the other platoon members. Then, Corporal Kennedy proceeded with his task and gave two runs to the platoon members at the beginning of that evening. The consumption of alcohol [10] After Corporal Kennedy provided runs to the platoon members, he parked the vehicle close to the location where he drove the platoon members, i.e., the Cheers Bar and Grill. This pub is located close to The Dome, a nightclub. It appears that Sergeant Hughes accepted his suggestion to stay downtown for the evening, making himself available to the other platoon members in the area if they needed a ride back to the accommodations at any time during the evening. [11] Corporal Kennedy spent a part of the evening with one of his friends, Derek MacDonald, playing on video lottery machines that could be found in the smoking room located between the Cheers and The Dome. Both won together about $300 and divided the amount by half for each. Corporal Kennedy proceeded to the bar in order to exchange the ticket given by the machine to cash the money. At the same time, he bought a beer for his friend and a bottle of water for himself. The kind of beer was a Keith's. [12] After he went back, both Mr. MacDonald and Corporal Kennedy continued to play on the video lottery machine and they won again some money. Mr. MacDonald went to the bar in order to cash again the money by bringing the ticket. Some time after he left, Mr. MacDonald asked Corporal Kennedy, by pointing his own
Page 4 of 12 glass of beer, if he wanted something. According to his testimony, Corporal Kennedy responded to his friend, in pointing the bottle of water that he had in his own hand, indicating that he wanted water. [13] Corporal Kennedy went to the washroom. On his way back, he had a chat with some friends in the smoking room, and he started, shortly after, to play again on the video lottery machine. It is where he met the shooter's girl. According to Corporal Kennedy's testimony, he had a "hit" on her. [14] Pursuant to the evidence heard, a shooter's girl is a waitress that carries on a tray with pre-poured small glasses of shooters in order to sell them to clients in the bar. Shooters are of different kind and contain one ounce of alcohol. Depending on the kind of alcohol in it, they can be named as "Sex on the beach", "Orgasm", or "B52". [15] Corporal Kennedy and the shooter's girl started flirting each other. Corporal Kennedy decided to buy a round of shooters from her and handed out each glass of shooters to those who wanted one, including Miss Watson and his good friend, Corporal Arseneau. Miss Watson did not take her shooter's glass and nobody mentioned who took it. According to Corporal Kennedy, he drank water and did not drink any shooter. He put back himself all empty glasses on the shooter's girl tray. He started chatting with the shooter's girl, and at some point, sat on her. [16] According to Corporal King's testimony, Corporal Kennedy drank a shooter at the same time as the shooter's girl. Corporal Kennedy confirmed in his testimony that Corporal King witnessed this specific event; however, both differ on the issue of consumption of alcohol by Corporal Kennedy. According to Corporal King's testimony, while he was in the smoking room having a cigarette, he witnessed Corporal Kennedy drinking a shooter and then informed the most senior corporal in the area, Corporal Bowmaster, of the incident. [17] After spending some time with the shooter's girl, Corporal Kennedy noticed that Mr. MacDonald started to play again on the video lottery machine, and he joined in. He mentioned to Mr. MacDonald that he wanted to go to the bar for buying water, and the latter specifically asked to Corporal Kennedy to buy him, at the same time, two beers. Corporal Kennedy proceeded and brought back two beers to Mr. MacDonald in the smoking room. [18] According to Corporal Bowmaster, shortly after he was told by Corporal King about the consumption of the shooter by Corporal Kennedy, he went just outside the smoking room and witnessed, through the glass, Corporal Kennedy drinking half a beer. He assumed that it was Keith's because the head on the top of the liquid and the liquid's colour was the same as the beer he had that night. [19] After he gave his two beers to Mr. MacDonald, Corporal Kennedy went
Page 5 of 12 to The Dome for a while where he met, briefly, Corporal Richardson. Sometime after, he grabbed some people and gave a first ride to Miss Watson, Corporal Arseneau, and some other persons. He went back downtown, and came back to the Dalhousie University when he realized that nobody else wanted a ride. He then went to sleep. [20] When they went back, around 0300 hours, Corporal Bowmaster and King reported to Sergeant Heagle the fact that they both saw Corporal Kennedy consuming alcohol that night. [21] In the morning, Corporal Kennedy was woken up by Sergeant Hughes. The latter asked him to put himself to the attention position and smelled him. He confronted Corporal Kennedy about his consumption of alcohol and smelled his breath. Corporal Kennedy denied firmly that he took alcohol. Sergeant Hughes went out of the room and, later in the day, informed Corporal Kennedy that he was the duty driver for all the Tattoo's period, i.e., two weeks. THE APPLICABLE LAW AND THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGE [22] Section 83 of the National Defence Act reads as follows: 83. Every person who disobeys a lawful command of a superior officer is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to imprisonment for life or to less punishment. [23] Then the prosecution had to prove the following essential elements for this offence beyond a reasonable doubt: the prosecution had to prove the identity of the accused and the date and place as alleged in the charged sheet; the prosecution also had to prove the following additional elements, the fact that an order was given to Corporal Kennedy, and that it was lawful, and that Corporal Kennedy received or knew the order; the fact that Corporal Kennedy was given the order by a superior officer, and that this status was known by him; the fact that Corporal Kennedy did not comply with the order; and finally, the blameworthy state of mind of Corporal Kennedy. [24] Section 129 of the National Defence Act reads, in part, as follows: 129. (2) An act or omission constituting an offence under section 72 or a contravention by any person of (a) any of the provisions of this Act, (b) any regulations, orders or instructions published for the general information and guidance of the Canadian Forces or any part thereof, or (c) any general, garrison, unit, station, standing, local or other orders,
Page 6 of 12 is an act, conduct, disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline. [25] For this alternative offence, the prosecution had to prove the following essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt: the prosecution had to prove, the identify of the accused and the date and place as alleged in the charge sheet; the prosecution also had to prove the following additional elements; the fact that there is a prejudice to good order and discipline in establishing the existence of the directive, that the directive was published and notified accordingly with the applicable section of the QR&O, and that the conduct of Corporal Kennedy amounted to a contravention of the directive; also, the prosecution has to prove the act alleged in the charge; and finally, the blameworthy state of mind of Corporal Kennedy. [26] Before this court provides it's legal analysis, it's appropriate to deal with the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a standard that is inextricably intertwined with the principle fundamental to all criminal trials. And these principals, of course, are well known to counsel, but other people in this courtroom may well be less familiar with them. [27] It is fair to say that the presumption of innocence is, perhaps, the most fundamental principle in our criminal law, and the principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an essential part of the presumption of innocence. In matters dealt with under the Code of Service Discipline, as the cases dealt with under the criminal law, every person charged with a criminal offence is presumed to be innocent until the prosecution proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. An accused person does not have to prove that he is innocent. It is up to the prosecution to prove its case on each element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. [28] The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to the individual items of evidence or to separate pieces of evidence that make up the prosecution's case, but to the total body of evidence upon which the prosecution relies to prove guilt. The burden or onus of proving the guilt of an accused person beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon the prosecution and it never shifts to the accused person. [29] A court must find an accused person not guilty if it has a reasonable doubt about his guilt or after having considered all of the evidence. The term, "beyond a reasonable doubt," has been used for a very long time. It is part of our history and traditions of justice. [30] In R. v. Lifchus, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, the Supreme Court of Canada proposed a model chart on reasonable doubt. The principles layed out in Lifchus have been applied in a number of Supreme Court and appellate court subsequent decisions. In substance, a reasonable doubt is not a far-fetched or frivolous doubt. It is not a doubt based on sympathy or prejudice, it is a doubt based on reason and common sense. It is
Page 7 of 12 a doubt that arrives at the end of the case, based not only on what evidence tells the court, but also on what that evidence does not tell the court. The fact that a person has been charged is no way indicative of his or her guilt, and I will add that only charges that are faced by an accused person are those that appear on the charge sheet before a court. [31] In R. v. Starr, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, at paragraph 242, the Supreme Court held that: ... an effective way to define the reasonable doubt standard for a jury is to explain that it falls much closer to absolute certainty than to proof on a balance of probabilities. On the other hand, it should be remembered that it is nearly impossible to prove anything with absolute certainty. The prosecution is not required to do so. Absolute certainty is a standard of proof that does not exist in law. The prosecution only has the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person, in this case Corporal Kennedy, beyond a reasonable doubt. To put it in perspective, if the court is convinced, or would have been convinced, that the accused is probably or likely guilty, then the accused would have been acquitted since proof of probable or likely guilt is not proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [32] What is evidence? Evidence may include testimony under oath or solemn affirmation before the court by witnesses about what they observed or what they did. It could be documents, photographs, maps or other items introduced by witnesses, the testimony of expert witnesses, formal admissions of facts by either the prosecution or the defence, and matters of which the court takes judicial notice. [33] It is not unusual that some evidence presented before the court may be contradictory. Often, witnesses may have different recollections of events. The court has to determine what evidence it finds credible. [34] Credibility is not synonymous with telling the truth, and a lack of credibility is not synonymous with lying. Many factors influence the court's assessment of the credibility of the testimonies of a witness. For example, a court will assess a witness's opportunity to observe, a witness's reasons to remember, like, were the events noteworthy, unusual and striking, or relatively unimportant and, therefore, understandably, more difficult to recollect? Does a witness have any interest in the outcome of the trial; that is, a reason to favour the prosecution or the defence, or is the witness impartial? This last factor applies in a somewhat different way to the accused. Even though it is reasonable to assume that the accused is interested in securing his or her acquittal, the presumption of innocence does not permit a conclusion that an accused will lie where that accused chooses to testify.
Page 8 of 12 [35] Another factor in determining credibility is the apparent capacity of the witness to remember. The demeanour of the witness while testifying is a factor which can be used in assessing credibility; that is, was the witness responsive to questions, straightforward in his or her answers, or evasive, hesitant, or argumentative? Finally, was the witness's testimony consistent with itself and with the uncontradicted facts? [36] Minor discrepancies, which can and do innocently occur, do not necessarily mean that the testimony should be disregarded. However, a deliberate falsehood is an entirely different matter. It is always serious, and it may well tint a witness's entire testimony. [37] The court is not required to accept the testimony of any witness, except to the extent that it has impressed the court as credible. However, a court will accept evidence as trustworthy unless there is a reason rather to disbelieve it. [38] As the rule of reasonable doubt applies to the issue of credibility, the court is required to definitely decide, in this case, first on the credibility of the accused, and to believe or disbelieve him. It is true that this case raises some important credibility issues, and it is one of those cases where the approach on the assessment of credibility expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742, can strictly be applied because the accused, Corporal Kennedy, testified. As established in that decision, at page 758, the text goes as follows: First, if you believe the evidence of the accused, obviously you must acquit. Second, if you do not believe the testimony of the accused but you are left in reasonable doubt by it, you must acquit. Third, even if you are not left in doubt by the evidence of the accused, you must ask yourself whether, on the basis of the evidence which you do accept, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by that evidence of the guilt of the accused. [39] Having instructed myself as to the onus and standard of proof, I will now turn to the question in issue put before the court and address the legal principles. ANALYSIS [40] Both parties agreed that the main question in issue on both charges, based on the evidence put before the court, is about the compliance or not, by Corporal Kennedy, with the order or directive concerning the non-consumption of alcohol while he was tasked as the duty driver for 2 RCR Pipes and Drums platoon on the evening and night of the 26 to 27 June 2005. All other essential elements, including the lawfulness of the order, concerning the first charge, and the prejudice to good order and discipline for the second charge, were established beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
Page 9 of 12 [41] On that specific issue, as stated earlier, the court has to determine first if the testimony provided by the accused must be believed or not. The nature of the evidence in this case requires this court to make certain findings as to the credibility of witnesses in order to assess properly the credibility of the accused in light of all the evidence. [42] Warrant Officer Hughes testified in a calm and straightforward manner. His testimony was coherent, respectful, and he had a clear recollection of the events. The court retains, mainly, the lawful order given by Warrant Officer Hughes to Corporal Kennedy about the consumption of alcohol while being the duty driver on the night of the 26 June 2005. Considering the event in the morning of the 27 June 2005, for Corporal Kennedy, the court does not think that it has been proven that the reputation of Warrant Officer Hughes was bad to the point that he should not be believed. However, the relevancy of Corporal Kennedy smelling alcohol that morning still to be proven because, in itself, this fact, accepted or not, does not prove anything. The court understands from Warrant Officer Hughes' testimony that some sort of investigation was done by him and some actions were taken toward Corporal Kennedy. [43] Corporal King testified in an honest, calm, and straightforward manner. He was not evasive or argumentative. He clearly answered to questions asked by both counsel. He is credible and reliable. His testimony was consistent with itself and with the uncontradicted facts. The fact that he saw, clearly, Corporal Kennedy drinking a shooter was a noteworthy, unusual, and striking event for him, considering that some hours earlier he heard personally that Corporal Kennedy was not supposed to consume any alcohol because he was the duty driver. When cross-examined, he described, in a disinterested manner, to the court what he saw and still remembered, clearly, the incident. About his consumption of alcohol at the time he witnessed the incident, the court does not see any reason for which he should not be believed on his capacity to see and understand what was happening. He reported the incident to a friend of the accused, Corporal Arseneau, to a superior at the bar, Corporal Bowmaster, and, sometime later, to Sergeant Hughes. He simply reported to the proper authority the infringement of an order, as it was his duty to do so. [44] Corporal Bowmaster testified exactly in the same way as Corporal King, even though it was for a different incident. As it was for Corporal King, drinking a beer was a noteworthy, unusual, and striking event for him that night, considering that some hours earlier he heard personally that Corporal Kennedy was not supposed to consume any alcohol because he was the duty driver, and because he was also warned on that issue by Corporal King. When cross-examined by the defence counsel, he described and confirmed what he witnessed in a firmly and disinterested matter. [45] The court wants to add, that at no point in time during the trial, it was demonstrated that Corporal King or Corporal Bowmaster were motivated by some sort of vengeance or demonstrated some sort of collusion. Both witnesses appeared to the
Page 10 of 12 court totally disinterested in this trial, and it seems that they just did their duty after what they witnessed that night. [46] Warrant Officer Fudge testified in a straightforward manner. He made very comprehensive to the court the publication and notification of the directive identified in the second charge. He's credible and reliable. [47] Miss Watson testified in an honest and straightforward manner, but her testimony is not reliable and very determinative with regard to the crucial fact, even though she did not take any alcohol that night. As the other witnesses called by the accused, she was unable to say conclusively that Corporal Kennedy did not consume any alcohol the night of the 26 to 27 June 2005, because she did not comprehensively spend her all night looking at him. She was mainly there to spend time with her roommate and Corporal Arseneau. According to her version of the facts, Corporal Kennedy was around her most of the time the night of the 26 June 2005, but she never noticed when he left the smoking area to go to the bar or the washroom. Moreover, there was no specific reason for her to notice that Corporal Kennedy was drinking alcohol that night. [48] The testimony of Corporal Arseneau was made in a straightforward manner. However, it appears to the court that he brought more confusion than anything else. He contradicted his fiancé, Miss Watson, when he mentioned that he arrived at the Cheers after her at the beginning of the night, contrary to what she said. Even though he spent most of his time in the smoking room, he was not very conclusive about the fact that Corporal Kennedy did or did not consume alcohol. On the shooter incident, without being prompted, he reported the fact that a glass of shooter was given to his fiancé, but she did not took it. He did not know who took this glass bought by Corporal Kennedy and left on the table. As he stated later in his testimony, Corporal Arseneau was logically more interested that night by Miss Watson than by Corporal Kennedy. He was more concerned about the security of his fiancé than his own when it was time to be drove back by Corporal Kennedy at the end of the night. Additionally, the court does not understand why Corporal Arseneau mentioned that he was told by Corporal King and Bowmaster, before the shooter incident, that Corporal Kennedy drank alcohol while the uncontradicted evidence demonstrated clearly that this was the initial incident that brought the attention of the two corporals on Corporal Kennedy's consumption of alcohol. Additionally, the court does not give much reliability to the fact that Corporal Arseneau smelled the breath of Corporal Kennedy before the latter took the wheel. Considering what he described about his own consumption of alcohol, he was not in a position to detect if someone else smelled alcohol that night. It is also reasonable to conclude that his version of events of his general understanding of the whole incident was, in some way, tainted by the fact that he was a good friend of Corporal Kennedy at the time.
Page 11 of 12 [49] Corporal Richardson testified in an honest and straightforward manner, but her testimony is not determinative at all with regard to the crucial fact of alcohol consumption by Corporal Kennedy, considering that she saw him very briefly that night, at two different occasions, for a total of seven minutes. [50] Corporal Kennedy testified in an anxious and in some straightforward manner. Without being prompted, he provided extensive details on what he did in the smoking room except for timings. Surprisingly, on that very issue, he was unable to provide any sort of time frame to the court for that night, even though he was cross-examined on this specific question. He got very excited when he reported the story about the two different occasions he won money on the video lottery machine. He got even more excited and enthusiastic when he reported the story with the shooter's girl. His testimony was somewhat consistent with uncontradicted fact, except on the very specific issue of consumption of alcohol by him. He provided extensive details when he bought and carried glass of shooters and beer in the smoking room. He was very argumentative about what was said by prosecution's witnesses, especially by Corporal King and Bowmaster and Warrant Officer Hughes. It is clear from his testimony that he was very angry in being tasked as the duty driver, and that he had planned something different for that night. [51] As Corporal Kennedy's roommate, Corporal Hilson did not bring much light with his testimony. During his cross-examination, he clearly admitted that he was not in a position to tell if Corporal Kennedy was smelling alcohol or not in the morning of 27 June 2005. [52] Corporal Firth testified in a straightforward manner; however, he did not say much about the foundation of his opinion to support the fact that Warrant Officer Hughes had a bad reputation to the point that he should not be believed. [53] Finally, Corporal Pierce testified in a calm and straightforward manner. However, when cross-examined, it is clear that his testimony on the reputation of Warrant Officer Hughes was not reliable. [54] In applying the test enunciated in the Supreme Court decision of R. v. W.(D.) quoted above, and having considered the evidence introduced before this court as a whole, the court finds reasons to disbelieve the accused and his testimony, and more specifically on the issue of consumption of alcohol by the accused on the night of the 26 to 27 June 2005, while he was ordered not to take any because he was the duty driver for the 2 RCR Pipes and Drums platoon. Consequently, the court does not believe the evidence provided by Corporal Kennedy. [55] Now, the court is turning itself to the second step of the test enunciated in the Supreme Court decision of R. v. W.(D.) quoted above. After having considered the evidence as a whole, this court is still not left in a reasonable doubt by the testimony
Page 12 of 12 of Corporal Kennedy on all the essential elements of the offence of disobedience to a lawful order. To the contrary, the testimony of Corporal Kennedy confirmed many uncontradicted elements including those provided by Corporal King and Bowmaster. [56] Finally, turning to the last step of the same test, on the basis of the evidence that this court accepts, the court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by it of the guilt of the accused regarding the offence of disobedience to a lawful command of a superior officer. In fact, it is clear for this court, that based on the evidence before it, Corporal Kennedy did not comply with the order he received. [57] Consequently, having regard to the evidence as a whole, the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the offence of disobedience to a lawful command of a superior officer. [58] Additionally, having regard to the finding of the court concerning the essential elements of section 83 of the National Defence Act, and the application of those elements to the facts of this case, the court is satisfied that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof by establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that the accused did not comply with the order he received from Sergeant Hughes. DISPOSITION [59] Corporal Kennedy, please stand up. Corporal Kennedy, this court finds you guilty of the first charge. Consequently, this court directs that the proceedings be stayed on the second charge. LIEUTENANT-COLONEL L.V. D'AUTEUIL, M.J. Counsel: Major S.D. Richards, Regional Military Prosecutions Atlantic Counsel for Her Majesty the Queen Lieutenant-Commander M. Reeskink, Directorate of Defence Counsel Services Counsel for Corporal J. Kennedy
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