Cour martiale

Informations sur la décision

Résumé :

ate de l’ouverture du procès : 20 janvier 2004.
Endroit : Centre Asticou, bloc 2600, pièce 2601, salle d’audience, 241 boulevard de la Cité-des-Jeunes, Gatineau (QC).
Chefs d’accusation:
• Chefs d’accusation 1, 2: Art. 130 LDN, agression sexuelle (art. 271 C. cr.).
• Chef d’accusation 3 (subsidiaire au chef d’accusation 4) : Art. 93 LDN, comportement déshonorant.
• Chef d’accusation 4 (subsidiaire au chef d’accusation 3) : Art. 129 LDN, comportement préjudiciable au bon ordre et à la discipline.
Résultats:
• VERDICTS : Chef d’accusation 1 : Non coupable. Chef d’accusation 2 : Coupable de l’infraction moindre et incluse de voies de fait. Chef d’accusation 3 : Une suspension d’instance. Chef d’accusation 4 : Coupable, mais que le mot « sexually » soit supprimé des détails.
• SENTENCE : Un blâme et une amende au montant de 4000$.

Contenu de la décision

Attention : ce document est disponible en anglais seulement.

COURT MARTIAL

 

Citation: R. v. Lieutenant-Commander L.B. Pringle, 2004 CM 3003

 

Date: 22 January 2004

Docket: 200409

 

Standing Court Martial

 

Gatineau, Quebec, Canada

Asticou Centre Gatineau

 

Her Majesty the Queen

 

- and –

 

Lieutenant-Commander L.B. Pringle, accused

 

Before: Commander P.J. Lamont, M.J.


 

Warning

Subject to sub-section 486(3) and 486(4) of the Criminal Code and section 179 of the National Defence Act, the court has directed that the identity of the complainant and any information that would disclose the identity of the complainant shall not be published in any document or broadcast in any way.

 

SENTENCE

 

(Orally)

 

[1]                    Lieutenant-Commander Pringle, having accepted and recorded your pleas of guilty to charges number two and four, the court now finds you guilty of the included offence of assault under charge number two and guilty of charge number four as amended.

 

[2]                    It now falls to me to determine and to pass a sentence upon you. In so doing, I have considered the principles of sentencing that apply in the ordinary courts of criminal jurisdiction in Canada and at courts martial. I have, as well, considered the facts of the case as described in the statement of circumstances, Exhibit 8, the evidence I have heard and the submissions of counsel, both for the prosecution and for the defence.

 

[3]                    The principles of sentencing guide the court in the exercise of its discretion in determining a fit and proper sentence in an individual case. The sentence should be broadly commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the blameworthiness, or degree of responsibility and character of the offender. The court is guided by the sentences imposed by other courts in previous, similar cases, not out of a slavish adherence to precedent but because it appeals to our common sense of justice that like cases should be treated in similar ways. Nevertheless, in imposing sentence the court takes account of the many factors that distinguish the particular case it is dealing with; both the aggravating circumstances that may call for a more severe punishment and the mitigating circumstances that may reduce a sentence.

 

[4]                    The goals and objectives of sentencing have been expressed in different ways in many previous cases. Generally, they relate to the protection of society, which includes, of course, the Canadian Forces, by fostering and maintaining a just, a peaceful, a safe and a law-abiding community. Importantly, in the context of the Canadian Forces these objectives include the maintenance of discipline; that habit of obedience which is so necessary to the effectiveness of an armed force. The goals and objectives also include deterrence of the individual so that the conduct of the offender is not repeated, and general deterrence so that others will not be led to follow the example of the offender. Other goals include the rehabilitation of the offender, the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender, and the denunciation of unlawful behaviour. One or more of these goals and objectives will inevitably predominate in arriving at a fit and just sentence in an individual case. Yet, it should not be lost sight of that each of these goals calls for the attention of the sentencing court and a fit and just sentence should be a wise blending of these goals, tailored to the particular circumstances of the case.

 

[5]                    As I explained to you when you tendered your pleas of guilty, section 139 of the National Defence Act prescribes the possible punishments that may be imposed at courts martial. Those possible punishments are limited by the provision of the law which creates the offence and provides for a maximum punishment, and is further limited to the jurisdiction that may be exercised by this court. Only one sentence is imposed upon an offender, whether the offender is found guilty of one or more different offences, but the sentence may consist of more than one punishment. It is an important principle that the court should impose the least severe punishment that will maintain discipline. In arriving at the sentence in this case, I have considered the direct and indirect consequences of the findings of guilt and the sentence I am about to impose.

 

[6]               The facts of the offences to which Lieutenant-Commander Pringle has pleaded guilty are set out in the statement of circumstances; Exhibit 8. During the period of late November 2002 to mid-January 2003, the offender was head of the Missiles, Launchers and Targets Team and a project manager involved in the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry for the Navy. The complainant, Ms X., was a civilian employed as his administrator. In this role, she was tasked on a day-to-day basis by the offender alone. For many months prior to November of 2002, they had enjoyed a productive working relationship and the complainant derived much satisfaction from her job. Beginning in late November of 2002, when the complainant returned to the office after an absence of some weeks, the offender's behaviour towards the complainant changed. She was subjected to unwanted advances including kissing on the lips on three occasions, over a period of weeks, an invitation to accompany the offender on a weekend trip and on a foreign posting and remarks about getting into bed. The complainant attempted to change the offender's behaviour by mature discussion with him on several occasions, but it appears to have had little effect. Eventually, the offender started making his own inquiries as to where the complainant lived and, as a result, the complainant became concerned about his continuing behaviour.

 

[7]                    I find that it must have been very clear to the offender as of 29 November, 2002, that the complainant did not consent to his advances, yet, he persisted in this unwanted behaviour.

 

[8]                    As a result of the offender's actions, the complainant felt she had to leave the work place. She became anxious and stressed, and required medication. She remains anxious about some aspects of her life. She is unable to socialize in the manner she could before these incidents and describes herself as “always looking over her shoulder.” She is troubled with self-doubt as she considers that the positive reports of her work provided by the offender may have simply been motivated by his lascivious desires rather than being an honest appraisal of her work. She experienced a severe anxiety attack at the prospect of returning to the same workplace after a period of sick leave, but was able to secure employment elsewhere within the Department of National Defence. She still suffers from anxiety and expects to continue to suffer from anxiety well into the future.

 

[9]                    Counsel before me have jointly submitted that a fit sentence in this case would be a severe reprimand and a fine in the amount of $4,000. I am well aware of the pronouncements of various courts of appeal across Canada, including the Court Martial Appeal Court, concerning joint submissions of counsel on sentencing. As Madam Justice Weiler stated in R. v. Castillo, a sentencing judge should not reject joint sentencing submissions unless the proposed sentence is contrary to the public interest or the sentence would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

 

[10]           Both counsel have pointed to mitigating circumstances in favour of the offender in support of the joint submission. Importantly, he has pleaded guilty to the offences at the first opportunity to do so. This indicates genuine remorse on his part for his actions. He has 32 years of service in the Canadian Forces with an excellent record. According to the testimony, he is highly regarded by his peers in the maritime engineering community. The prosecutor describes the offender as an exemplary officer and the offences as out of character. Counsel also points out that the offender will likely suffer career consequences as a result of his actions and of these proceedings.

 

[11]           Against these considerations the court must consider the aggravating circumstances, including the nature of the offences of assault and harassment. The Canadian Forces cannot discharge its important functions without leadership. It is axiomatic that leadership requires respect by a leader for his or her superiors and for his or her employees, whether they be military members or civilians. Harassing behaviour, as evidenced in this case, is the antithesis of respect, and therefore directly affects the ability of the Canadian Forces to fulfil its important tasks.

 

[12]                The conduct of the offender continued over a period of weeks, despite clear indications to the offender that his attentions and conduct were unwelcome. The behaviour occurred in the work place and caused severe stress and anxiety to the complainant, as I have mentioned. As a result, an apparently productive working relationship was ruined, as the offender pursued his own selfish interest and abused his position of authority with respect to the complainant.

 

[13]           I have been referred to two previous cases at courts martial; the cases of Captain Howson and Major Byrne. In both cases, the sentence consisted of a severe reprimand and a fine for assaultive behaviour. An important distinction from the present case is that neither of those cases involved harassing conduct over a period of weeks.

 

[14]                Taking account of all these matters, I cannot say that the proposed disposition is either contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. In my view, the proposed disposition is within the range of sentence for these kinds of offences and I therefore accept the joint submission of counsel.

 

[15]                The offence of assault is a secondary designated offence for purposes of a DNA order under the Criminal Code. As such, this court has the authority to order the offender to provide a DNA sample if the court martial is satisfied that it is in the best interest of the administration of justice to do so. I am not so satisfied and accordingly I make no DNA order.

 

[16]                Stand up, please, Lieutenant-Commander Pringle.

 

[17]                You are sentenced to a severe reprimand and a fine in the amount of $4,000 to be paid at the rate of $400 per month, the first instalment to be paid by the end of February 2004 and thereafter $400 per month until the fine is paid. In the event you are released from the Canadian Forces for any reason, the unpaid amount of the fine then outstanding is due the day prior to your release.

 

[18]                March out Lieutenant-Commander Pringle.


Counsel:

 

Major M. Trudel, Regional Military Prosecutions East, Counsel for Her Majesty the Queen

 

Major J.L.V.G. Roy, Regional Military Prosecutions East, Assistant counsel for Her Majesty the Queen

 

Mr David J. Bright, Boyne Clarke, Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, Counsel for Lieutenant-Commander Pringle

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